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Abstract
A central equation for the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) is the government
budget constraint (or ”government valuation equation”), which equates the real value of
government debt to the present value of fiscal surpluses. In the past decade, the governments
of most developed economies have paid very low interest rates, and there are many other
periods in the past in which this has been the case. In this paper, we revisit the implications
of the FTPL in a world where the rate of return on government debt may be below the
growth rate of the economy, considering different sources for the low returns: dynamic
inefficiency, the liquidity premium of government debt, or its favorable risk profile.
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1 Introduction
Models of monetary economies are plagued by the presence of multiple equilibria, which weakens
the ability to make tight predictions.1 To select among them, it has become common to appeal
to what Leeper [20] defined as “active monetary policies.” However, these rules imply local deter-
minacy, but not global uniqueness, and are therefore not universally accepted as an equilibrium
selection criterion.2
An alternative approach to price-level determinacy follows what Leeper [20] defined “active
fiscal policies,” in which the requirement that government debt follows a stable trajectory is used
to select an equilibrium. In particular, since Sims [29] and Woodford [32], this approach is known
as the “fiscal theory of the price level” (FTPL from now on). According to the FTPL, price level
determinacy follows when the present value of government (primary) surpluses does not react to
the price level in a way that ensures government budget balance; rather, government debt is a
promise to deliver “dollars” (either purely a unit of account, or the underlying currency which
by assumption can be freely printed by the government), and the value of a dollar adjusts in
equilibrium so that the present value of surpluses and the real value of debt match.
Whether the FTPL is a valid selection criterion has been controversial.3 Bassetto [2] analyzes
the issue in a game-theoretic environment, where the price level arises explicitly from the actions
of the agents in the economy and their interaction; in this more complete description of the eco-
nomic environment, the FTPL remains valid when surpluses are always positive, but it requires
adoption of more sophisticated strategies when the desired equilibrium path involves periods of
net borrowing. This distinction is particularly important in the context of our analysis, because
we find that, across a variety of models, low interest rates are compatible with a stable and pos-
itive path for debt only when the government runs primary deficits, at least on average, which
is precisely the environment in which the theory is on weakest ground.
1This issue is addressed in any graduate textbook in macroeconomics; see e.g. Sargent [27], Woodford [33],
or Ljungqvist and Sargent [21]. Woodford [32] contains an exhaustive description of the nature of equilibrium
multiplicity for a cash-in-advance economy under money-supply and interest-rate rules.
2See Cochrane [10] for a particularly stinging critique of active rules as a device to achieve uniqueness.
3Examples of criticisms appear in Buiter [5], Kocherlakota and Phelan [18], and Niepelt [25].
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Figure 1: Reproduced from Yi and Zhang [34].
In this paper, we sidestep the controversy and assume that the government can indeed commit
to a sequence of real taxes, independent of the realization of the price level, but we reassess
whether the uniqueness result of the FTPL continues to hold in economies in which the interest
rate on government debt is persistently below the growth rate of the economy. This question
is motivated by the long decline in real interest rates on government debt from the high values
of the 1980s and early 1990s. As an example, Figure 1 (reproduced from Yi and Zhang [34])
plots the experience of the G7 countries and shows that real interest rates on government debt
below the growth rate of the economy might well be the norm rather than the exception for those
countries. When interest rates fall short of the growth rate of the economy, the present value of
primary surpluses may not be well defined, posing a challenge for the FTPL.
We study three main reasons why interest rates may be low, and we show that the validity of
the FTPL is sensitive to the specific reason.
Our first experiment is the most favorable to the FTPL. It studies a stochastic economy and
analyzes what happens when real rates of return are low because of high risk premia. In this case,
an equilibrium still requires the present value of government surpluses to be (positive and) well
defined and the FTPL remains valid, although without the risk adjustment expected surpluses
may well be negative.
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Second, we entertain the possibility that the economy might be dynamically inefficient. In this
context, we show that the FTPL is no longer able to select a unique equilibrium, and multiple
price levels are consistent with an equilibrium even when taxes are set in real terms and do not
adjust. Even then, the FTPL can select a range of equilibrium prices even when monetary policy
is run as in Sargent and Wallace [28] and no prediction would be possible otherwise.
The hypothesis of dynamic inefficiency has been revived by Geerolf [15], who rebuts the neg-
ative evidence in Abel et al. [1]. Nonetheless, other authors have emphasized that the rate of
return on capital has not declined in line with that of government debt.4 Our other explana-
tions explore economies in which it is special characteristics of government debt that lower its
equilibrium rate of return compared to other assets.
Finally, we study what happens when government debt provides liquidity services, so that
it has itself some of the characteristics usually associated with money. This new economy is
described by equations which are very similar to the first one, since debt played the role of
money there too, but with the important difference that negative holdings are now ruled out.
Restricting our attention to deterministic paths, we can prove that the FTPL holds if primary
surpluses are positive (at least asymptotically), but in this case we can also show that the
interest rate will necessarily exceed the growth rate of the economy (normalized to zero in our
case). When instead primary surpluses are zero or negative, many equilibria where debt has
positive value exist, and our results mimic what happens in a dynamically inefficient economy.
This economy is similar to that analyzed by Domı´nguez and Gomis-Porqueras [14], who revisit
Leeper’s [20] analysis of active vs. passive monetary and fiscal rules and also find that the link
between Leeper’s original classification and determinacy and uniqueness of an equilibrium breaks
down when government debt plays a liquidity role.5
Concerning the conduct of fiscal policy, these results suggest three main conclusions:
• The ability of the FTPL to select a unique equilibrium when interest rates are low is not
4See e.g. Yi and Zhang [34] and Marx, Mojon, and Velde [22].
5In a related model, Cui [11] analyzes the local dynamics around a steady state with positive primary surplus
and finds that Leeper’s [20]’s classification still holds even though there is a liquidity premium; this matches with
our observation that the FTPL holds when the government always delivers surpluses.
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robust across specifications; appealing to fiscal policy to achieve a price level target is thus
fraught with even greater difficulties than those that arise in economies where returns are
such that computing present values is always possible.
• It is difficult to blame an excessively conservative fiscal policy for the recent experience
of low inflation, because, over extended periods of time, low interest rates and stable (or
increasing) government debt levels coexist only when fiscal policy entails primary deficits
on average. Moreover, the presence of multiple equilibria makes it problematic to use
comparative statics to study the effects of fiscal expansions.
• While unsuccessful at uniquely pinning down the price level, the FTPL still provides a
lower bound on prices across all the environments that we consider here, which implies
that it is not completely devoid of content.
In Section 2, we start by purely analyzing the government budget constraint, and show how
sustained primary deficits are needed to keep debt positive when interest rates fall short of
the growth rate of the economy. The following three sections derive further implications by
considering specific reasons for low interest rates: risk premia, dynamic inefficiency, or liquidity.
Section 6 summarizes the lessons we draw and suggests future directions of analysis.
2 Preliminaries
Before we embark on analyzing the validity of the FTPL in specific models that feature low
interest rates, it is useful to probe the implications of low interest rates just from analyzing the
government budget constraint, an equation that holds across all of the models we will consider.
For simplicity, we will concentrate our analysis on one-period debt. Let Bt be promised nominal
debt repayments by the government due at the beginning of period t, Rt be the nominal interest
rate, Pt be the price level, and τt be real taxes. The government budget constraint is
Bt+1
1 +Rt
= Bt − Ptτt, (1)
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where we abstract from government spending, since its presence does not affect any of our
subsequent results.6
Since the government tax base is related to the size of the economy, it is convenient to rescale
debt and taxes by real output yt. Defining xt := τt/yt, (1) can be rewritten as
Bt+1
Pt+1yt+1
=
(1 +Rt)Ptyt
Pt+1yt+1
(
Bt
Ptyt
− xt
)
. (2)
In this paper, we are interested in environments in which the real return on government debt
is below the growth rate of the economy. Consider first a deterministic economy; then, the
condition becomes simply
(1 +Rt)Ptyt
Pt+1yt+1
< α < 1. (3)
Let the (gross) growth rate be 1 + gt+1 = yt+1/yt and let the (gross) real interest rate be
1 + rt+1 = (1 +Rt)Pt/Pt+1. Iterating (2) from period 0 forward and assuming that the economy
starts with positive initial debt, this yields
Bt
PtYt
=
B0
P0Y0
t∏
s=1
(
1 + rs
1 + gs
)
−
t−1∑
s=0
xs
t∏
v=s+1
(
1 + rv
1 + gv
)
< αt
B0
P0Y0
−
t−1∑
s=0
xs
t∏
v=s+1
(
1 + rv
1 + gv
)
.
(4)
If taxes converge asymptotically to some value x¯ and government debt is to remain positive (and
bounded away from zero), equation (4) implies that x¯ < 0. This is intuitive: when the interest
rate is below the growth rate of the economy, the debt/GDP ratio shrinks to zero on its own,
and continuing primary deficits are required to prevent debt from vanishing in the limit (or even
becoming negative). If taxes do not converge to a steady state, equation (4) still implies that a
distributed sum must remain negative in order for government debt not to disappear or become
negative.
In stochastic environments, the real rate of return on government debt may or may not exceed
the growth rate of the economy, and we instead study what happens when the expected return
6When government spending is present, our results about the signs of taxes should be reinterpreted as applying
to the sign of primary surpluses instead.
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is low. More precisely, the corresponding version of condition (3) which we study is
Et
[
(1 +Rt)Ptyt
Pt+1yt+1
]
< α < 1. (5)
We then obtain
E0
Bt
PtYt
= E0
{
B0
P0Y0
t∏
s=1
(
1 + rs
1 + gs
)
−
t−1∑
s=0
xs
t∏
v=s+1
(
1 + rv
1 + gv
)}
< αt
B0
P0Y0
− E0
[
t−1∑
s=0
xs
t∏
v=s+1
(
1 + rv
1 + gv
)]
.
(6)
In order for the expected debt to GDP ratio to remain bounded away from zero in the limit, we
need
lim
t→∞
E0
[
t−1∑
s=0
xs
t∏
v=s+1
(
1 + rv
1 + gv
)]
< 0. (7)
Equation (6) is slightly more involved than (4), since the expectation about the future sum of
taxes also involves covariance terms with realized rates of return; even in this case, a suitably
distorted expectation of sums of future taxes needs to be negative to sustain a positive debt/GDP
ratio.
Without taking a specific stance on the nature of the economy at hand, pure accounting
implies that, in economies with low interest rates, the government will necessarily run recurrent
primary deficits. As discussed in Bassetto [2], this by itself has significant implications for the
FTPL, since the fiscal strategies that support a unique equilibrium are more involved when the
equilibrium features primary deficits.
Following Cochrane’s [9] analogy, when the government always runs primary surpluses, gov-
ernment debt looks like a corporate stock paying a stream of positive dividends, and the price
level can be viewed as the inverse of the value of this stock. Just as any mispricing of the stock
would not require an adjustment in the dividends paid by the corporation, any deviation in the
general level of prices would not require an adjustment in the surpluses that the government
raises to reabsorb the money created when nominal debt is repaid. However, when primary
deficits are part of the picture, the proper analogy is with a corporation which may have trouble
raising fresh funds from investors: in this case, mispricing of the stock could force the corporation
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to alter its investment plans and thus its future dividends, and likewise would be true in the case
of the government and its debt.
In Sections 4 and 5 we highlight even greater challenges that low interest rates may pose for
the FTPL, but first we consider a more benign case.
3 An Economy with High Risk Premia
We study an economy in which the presence of risk implies that households are happy saving
in the form of government debt for precautionary reasons even though its expected return falls
short of the expected growth of the economy.
We consider a pure-exchange economy with a continuum of identical infinitely-lived agents
and a government, similar to that analyzed by Cochrane [9].7
Private agents can save by buying one-period nominal government debt Bt; they are subject
to a lower bound on debt holdings Bt
Ptyt
≥ −B, which we assume never to be binding (other than
in the limit, through the transversality condition). The government sets a fixed and constant
nominal interest rate R at which debt is issued. In this and the following sections, we abstract
from any role for money, so that R measures government promises in an abstract unit of account.
However, introducing a role for money does not change any of our results, as long as money is
elastically supplied at the interest rate R; we illustrate this in Appendix B for the economy of
Section 5.
The representative consumer discounts utility at β ∈ (0, 1), pays (real) lump-sum taxes τt,
and chooses a sequence {ct, Bt}∞t=0 to solve
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βt
c1−γt − 1
1− γ
subject to
Ptct +
Bt+1
(1 +R)
+ Ptτt = Ptyt +Bt
taking as given {yt, τt, Rt, pt}∞t=0 and the initial bond holdings B0.
7As discussed by Cochrane, the presence of cash in not essential for the results, and we continue to abstract
from it.
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Letting pit+1 = Pt+1/Pt be gross inflation from t to t+ 1 and
zt := β
tc−γt
be the real stochastic discount factor, the first-order condition for the consumer reduces to
Et
[
1 +R
pit+1
· zt+1
zt
]
= 1, (8)
along with the transversality condition8
lim
s→∞
Et
[
Bt+szt+s
Pt+s(1 +R)s
]
= 0
The government uses direct lump-sum taxes and new debt to repay its existing obligations every
period, subject to the budget constraint (1). In equilibrium, the transversality condition is
necessary to ensure that consumers are willing to hold debt, which leads to an intertemporal
budget constraint (the core equation of FTPL)
Bt
Pt
= Et
∞∑
s=0
[
zt+s
zt
τt+s
]
. (9)
This economy is a textbook version of the models used to illustrate the FTPL. The present
value of future primary surpluses must be well defined in a competitive equilibrium, since the
transversality condition is necessary for household optimization. If taxes are set exogenously in
real terms, the present value pins down the price level both in period 0 and in all subsequent
periods, as long as the present value itself is positive as of time 0 (otherwise no equilibrium would
exist with B0 > 0).
The only difference with the standard treatment is the observation that equation (9) does not
rule out the possibility that (5) and (7) hold as well. In particular, while the present value of
taxes has to be positive, it is quite possible that E(τt+s) is negative in all periods. We illustrate
this possibility in Appendix A by considering a specific endowment process and fiscal policy for
which government debt is risk free in real terms, equation (5) holds, and expected taxes are
always negative.
8For a discussion of the necessity of transversality conditions in stochastic environments, see Kamihigashi [17].
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4 Dynamic Inefficiency
While the present value of government surpluses was well defined in the previous section, we
now turn to environments where this is no longer the case. In this section, we illustrate the
implications of the FTPL in dynamically inefficient economies. We work with a simple model
of overlapping-generations economies where people live for two periods, based on Sargent [27],
chapter 7. This setup is useful to obtain analytical results that readily generalize to more complex
environments in which other frictions imply dynamic inefficiency.
We consider a pure exchange economy populated by overlapping generations of constant size,
normalized to 1. Each generation lives for two periods. To further keep notation simple, we
assume that the endowment is constant over time, and we abstract from any uncertainty. The
income of each household is wy when young and wo when old. Households have preferences given
by
U(cyt , c
o
t+1), (10)
where cyt (c
o
t ) is consumption by the young (old) in period t. The only asset in the economy is
one-period government debt, as introduced in Section 2. In period 0, there is an initial stock of
nominal debt B0. As in the previous section, the government sets a constant nominal interest
rate R. Taxes are raised in a real amount τt from the old;
9 this is a transfer if τt < 0.
The budget constraint for the generation born in period t is given by
Ptc
y
t +
Bt+1
1 +R
≤ Ptwy, (11)
Pt+1c
o
t+1 ≤ Pt+1(wo − τt+1) +Bt+1. (12)
The old cohort in period 0 simply consumes all of its after-tax endowment and its savings:
P0c
o
0 = P0(w
o − τ0) +B0 (13)
9Our results do not depend on the way taxes are allocated across generations, as long as the allocation is fixed
over time. Of course, the range of parameters for which dynamic inefficiency arises, with its implications for the
FTPL, do depend on this allocation.
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With a constant nominal rate R, the real interest rate in the economy between periods t and
t+ 1 is
1 + rt+1 := (1 +R)
Pt
Pt+1
, (14)
the problem of maximizing (10) subject to (11) and (12) yields a (real) saving function f(1+rt+1).
We assume that U is strictly increasing in both arguments, strictly quasiconcave, continuously
differentiable, that consumption when young and old are gross substitutes, and that Inada con-
ditions apply. Under these assumptions, f is strictly increasing in the real interest rate, which
allows us to invert the function and obtain the equilibrium real interest rate as a function of sav-
ings by the young: rt+1 = r(st+1), where st+1 = c
y
t −wy. Since the growth rate of this economy is
normalized to zero, we are interested in the case in which f(1) > 0, or, equivalently, r(0) < 0:10
young households have a sufficient need to save for their old age that they are willing to do so
even at a zero interest rate, which allows for dynamically inefficient equilibria with positive debt
to arise. The government budget constraint in period t is given by (1).
A competitive equilibrium of this economy is given by a sequence {cyt , cot , Pt, rt, Bt+1}∞t=0 such
that the households maximize their utility subject to their budget constraints, the government
budget constraint holds in each period t, the definition of real rate (14) applies, and markets
clear, i.e.,
Ptf(1 + rt+1) = Bt+1/(1 +R). (15)
We compute competitive equilibria following Sargent [27]. Define pit+1 := Pt+1/Pt to be the
gross inflation rate between t and t+ 1. Combining equations (1), (14), and (15), an equilibrium
must satisfy the following difference equation:
f(1 + rt+1) = (1 + rt)f(1 + rt)− τt, t ≥ 1 (16)
with an initial condition
f(1 + r1) =
B0
P0
− τ0. (17)
10If preferences satisfy Inada conditions, this will necessarily happen provided the endowment when young is
sufficiently larger than the endowment when old.
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It is easier to analyze this equation in terms of the savings by the young, which gives
st+1 = (1 + r(st))st − τt t ≥ 1 (18)
and
s1 =
B0
P0
− τ0. (19)
We concentrate our attention to the case of constant taxes, τt = τ , t ≥ 0, in which the
difference equation is time invariant and clearer results can be established analytically.
Proposition 1. • If τ > 0, the difference equation (18) admits exactly two steady states,
one with positive and one with negative savings.
• If τ = 0, the difference equation (18) admits exactly two steady states, one with zero and
one with positive savings.
• If τ < 0, there generically exists an even number of steady states, all of which feature
positive saving. If τ is sufficiently close to zero, the number of steady states is two, and if
it is sufficiently negative it is zero (no steady states exist).
Proof. A steady state s¯ requires r(s¯)s¯ = τ . The Inada conditions imply lims→wy r(s) = ∞
and lims→−∞ r(s) = −1, which, in turn, means that lims→wy r(s)s = lims→−∞ r(s)s = ∞.
Furthermore,
d[r(s)s]
ds
= sr′(s) + r(s).
Thus, sr(s) is monotonically increasing when both s and r(s) are positive, and monotonically
decreasing when they are both negative. sr(s) = 0 when either s = 0 or r(s) = 0. Since r(0) < 0
and r is increasing, r(s) = 0 occurs exactly at one point, at a value sˆ > 0, which proves the
statement for the case in which τ = 0. For τ > 0, the derivative and limits above imply that there
exists exactly one steady state in (−∞, 0) and one in (sˆ,∞), which again proves the relevant
statement. Finally, for τ < 0, we know sr(s) > τ for all values of s ∈ (−∞, 0] ∪ [sˆ, wy). By
continuity, the number of steady states in the interval (0, sˆ) must be generically even.11 We can
11For a measure-zero set of values of τ , sr(s) will have a tangency point to τ , in which case an odd number of
steady states can occur. Proposition 2 applies to this case if one interprets the tangency point as two coincident
steady states.
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also remark that, again by continuity, the number of steady states for τ < 0 but sufficiently
close to zero must be exactly two (as in the case of τ = 0), and no steady state will exist if τ is
sufficiently negative, since sr(s) attains an interior minimum, which completes the proof.
To complete the characterization of the equilibria, the following proposition analyzes the
dynamics of the system away from the steady state.
Proposition 2. • If no steady state of the difference equation (18) exists, then st+1 is mono-
tonically increasing and it would eventually exceed wy, where the difference equation ceases
to be defined: hence, no competitive equilibrium exists.
• Let there be 2N steady states, ordered (s¯1, . . . , s¯2N). If the initial saving rate is s1 < s¯2,
then st converges monotonically to s¯
1. If N > 1 and s1 ∈ (s¯2k, s¯2k+2), k = 1, ...N − 1, st
converges monotonically to s¯2k+1. Finally, if s1 > s¯
2N , then st is monotonically increasing
and eventually exceeds wy, which implies that no equilibrium exists for such an initial
condition.
Proof. First, lims→wy r(s)s = ∞ (or lims→−∞ r(s)s = ∞), along with continuity, implies that
st+1 > st always if no steady state exists. In this case, equilibrium would require a monotonically
increasing sequence {st}∞t=1, which cannot converge, because any convergence point would have
to be a steady state. Since {st}∞t=1 is bounded by the endowment wy, a contradiction ensues,
and no equilibrium can exist.
When 2N steady states exist, the same limits imply st+1 > st when st < s¯
1, st > s¯
2N , or
st ∈ (s¯2k, s¯2k+1), k = 1, . . . , N − 1. Conversely, st+1 < st when st ∈ (s¯2k−1, s¯2k), k = 1, . . . , N .
Furthermore, given any steady state s¯i, we have
st+1 = st + r(st)st − τ = st + r(st)st − r(s¯i)s¯i.
For st > s¯
i,
st+1 = st + r(st)st − r(s¯i)s¯i > st + r(s¯i)(st − s¯i) > s¯i
with the converse being true for st < s¯
i. Hence given any initial condition s1, the sequence of
saving will never “jump over” a steady state, but rather it will monotonically converge to an
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odd-numbered steady state. The exception is the case in which s1 > s¯
2N , in which the sequence
increases monotonically up to the point at which no solution exists.
Propositions 1 and 2 describe the behavior of the economy given s1; more specifically, provided
τ is not too negative, they show that a continuum of values of s1 ∈ (−∞, s¯MAX] are consistent
with a competitive equilibrium, where s¯MAX is the largest steady state of the difference equation.
The economic intuition is straightforward. In order for young households to find it optimal
to choose a lower value of s, the interest rate must be lower as well. When taxes are positive,
a unique steady state with positive saving and positive interest rates exists: above it, govern-
ment debt dynamics become explosive. However, if real debt starts below this steady state, it
decreases and eventually becomes negative. The economy converges to another, dynamically
inefficient steady state: here, the interest rate is negative, so that households borrow more from
the government when young than they will repay in their old age, and taxes are exactly sufficient
for the government to restore its asset position to lend to the subsequent generation. The ex-
istence of this second steady state is the key difference from the standard, representative-agent
economy, in which the steady-state interest rate must necessarily be positive.
While in the representative-agent economy it is impossible for debt to have positive value
when τ ≤ 0 for sure, this is not the case in the overlapping-generation economy, where dynamic
inefficiency implies that money (or unbacked debt) can have value: hence, provided τ is not too
negative, the economy can still admit positive values of debt.
In order to fully characterize the set of competitive equilibria of the economy, the last step is
to use the initial condition (19) to relate saving s1 to the initial price level, P0. We obtain
B0
P0
= τ + s1.
Assuming that the economy starts with positive values of government debt and that s¯MAX+τ > 0,
the requirement that s1 ∈ (−∞, s¯MAX] implies that there exists a continuum of equilibria indexed
by the initial price level, with12
P0 ∈ [(s¯MAX + τ)/B0,∞). (20)
12The condition s¯MAX + τ > 0 is an implicit characterization, since s¯MAX is itself a function of τ . However,
from proposition 1, we know that s¯MAX > 0, and it is straightforward to prove that it is a decreasing function of
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Equation (20) proves that the FTPL breaks down in our overlapping-generations economy: even
with a fixed nominal interest rate and a fixed amount of real taxes, a continuum of possible
price levels emerge. In Woodford [32], the FTPL explicitly appears as a way of selecting among
equilibria in monetary economies, to remedy the fact that the monetary side alone typically does
not achieve global uniqueness of an equilibrium. However, in overlapping-generations economies
in which dynamic inefficiency is possible, government debt itself is akin to money, and hence the
original multiplicity reemerges.
With a continuum of possible equilibrium price levels, we cannot rely on comparative statics
for tight predictions on the inflationary consequences of lowering τ , providing a cautionary tale
for using fiscal policy as a substitute for monetary policy to achieve a desired price target. While
uniqueness fails in our environment, equation (20) still imposes a lower bound on prices, so that
the FTPL is not completely devoid of content even in a dynamically inefficient economy.
Remark 1. A possible criticism of the analysis above is that the general specification of the
FTPL does not require that a sequence of real taxes should be independent of the initial price
level, but rather that the present value of the sequence should be. With the possibility of dynamic
inefficiency, computing present values becomes problematic, because they may not be well defined.
However, we can easily construct an example in which even this version of the FTPL fails.
Specifically, consider a sequence in which τ0 > 0 and τt = 0, t > 0. For this sequence, the
present value of taxes is always τ0, independently of the initial price level, and yet there exist a
continuum of equilibria indexed by
P0 ∈ [(s¯MAXτ=0 + τ0)/B0,∞),
where the subscript to s¯MAX makes it explicit that it refers to the (maximal) steady state of the
economy with no taxes (since taxes will indeed be zero from period 1 onwards).
Remark 2. The two-period overlapping-generations economy and our assumptions on f imply
relatively that all deterministic equilibria feature monotone dynamics. By relaxing these assump-
τ . Hence, s¯MAX + τ > 0 will always hold for τ ≥ 0, and also for τ < 0, provided it is not too negative. Finally,
note that there is a range of negative values of τ for which steady states exist but s¯MAX + τ ≤ 0: for these values,
competitive equilibria would exist for negative initial amounts of debt, but none exists if B0 > 0.
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tions, it would be possible to obtain cycles or even chaotic dynamics. An early survey of these
possibilities appears in Woodford [31]. Furthermore, in a stochastic environment, sunspot equi-
libria would emerge. Our conclusion is robust to these more exotic environments: specifying an
exogenous path for real taxes is insufficient to pin down the initial price level, and the FTPL
breaks down.
5 Debt as a Source of Liquidity
In the previous section, government debt bears a low rate of return because households have a
large desire to save and there are no other assets that would allow them to earn a better rate of
return.13 Here, we study an economy which is dynamically efficient and in which private assets
pay a rate of return which is higher than the growth rate of the economy (normalized to zero);
government debt pays a lower rate of return instead because it plays a special liquidity role,
allowing some transactions which cannot be completed by exchanging private assets. In common
with the previous section, government debt has itself the characteristics of money, and the only
difference is the role money plays.
We develop our analysis in the context of the model developed by Lagos and Wright [19]; the
analysis would be similar if we considered a cash-in-advance model, or alternative models where
debt facilitates transactions and/or relaxes liquidity constraints.
5.1 The Basic Environment
We consider an economy populated by a continuum of identical infinitely-lived households and
a government. Each period is divided into two subperiods.
In the first subperiod (the “morning”), households disperse in bilateral anonymous markets,
where they have an opportunity to buy a good that they like with probability χ ∈ (0, 1) and they
have an opportunity to produce the good that the other party likes with the same probability.
13As is well known, similar results apply even if physical capital were present, as long as it is subject to a
sufficiently decreasing rate of return.
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Double-coincidence meetings are ruled out. In these meetings, private credit and privately-issued
assets cannot be recorded and/or recognized: only government debt can be used in exchange for
the desired good. We assume that buyers make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the sellers, which,
given the preferences below, is equivalent to competitive pricing.14
In the second subperiod (the “evening”) a centralized market opens, where a good is traded
that all households value and can produce. In this market, a record-keeping technology is present,
and households can trade the evening good, privately-issued claims, and government debt. The
government levies taxes according to an exogenous real sequence {τt}∞t=0, repays maturing debt,
and supplies new nominally risk-free debt at a set interest rate R. In Appendix B, we add money
paying no interest, so that R is the opportunity cost of holding money vs. government debt.
Preferences of each household are given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [u(qt)− nt + ct − yt] ,
where qt is the consumption of the morning good, u is strictly increasing and strictly concave
with u(0) = 0, ct is the consumption of the evening good, and nt and yt are the production of
the morning good and evening good, respectively. Production enters negatively in the utility
function because it requires labor effort. We assume that there exists q∗ ∈ (0,+∞) such that
u′(q∗) = 1. We will concentrate on equilibria where aggregates are deterministic, hence the
expected value is taken with respect to the idiosyncratic history of matches encountered by a
household.
5.2 Characterizing the Economy
Let Wt(b, a) be the value for an agent who enters the centralized market with b units of bonds
and a units of private claims, and let Vt(b, a) be the value of the same position upon entering
the decentralized market. We have
Wt(b, a) = max
c,y,b′,a′
{c− y + βEtVt+1(b′, a′)} s.t. (21)
14Similar results would apply to different bargaining protocols.
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Ptc+
a′
1 +Rpt
+
b′
1 +R
≤ Pt(y − τt) + a+ b, (22)
a′ ≥ −aPt, (23)
and
b′ ≥ 0. (24)
Pt is the price of goods in term of nominal claims in the centralized market, and R
p
t is the
nominal interest rate on private claims between periods t and t + 1. Equation (23) imposes a
borrowing limit on households so that they cannot engage in Ponzi schemes; equation (24) bans
naked short selling of government debt. While privately-issued claims and government bonds are
perfect substitutes when entering into the centralized market, the two assets are different in the
decentralized market, and equation (24) formalizes the constraint that only the government can
issue the latter.
The solution to maximizing (21) subject to (22), (23), and (24) yields
Wt(b, a) = Wˆt +
a+ b
Pt
, (25)
where Wˆt depends on subsequent choices, but is independent of the current state. When buyers
and sellers meet in the decentralized market, in any meeting in which buyers exchange b˜ units
of government bonds for q˜ units of goods, equation (25) implies that the sellers’ participation
constraint is
− q˜ + b˜/Pt ≥ 0. (26)
Since buyers make a take-it-or-leave-it offer, equation (26) is equivalent to a “bonds-in-advance”
constraint in which buyers can purchase the good at the linear price Pt (the same price that will
prevail in the centralized market), up to their endowment of government bonds.
Using equation (26), and exploiting the fact that all the surplus from decentralized trade is
appropriated by the buyers, the value function at the beginning of the period, before it is known
who will be a seller, who will be a buyer, and who will not trade, is given by
Vt(b, a) = Wt(b, a) + χmax
q
[u(q)− q] = Wˆt + a+ b
Pt
+ χmax
q
[u(q)− q], (27)
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subject to
Ptq ≤ b. (28)
It is straightforward to verify that ∂Vt(b,a)
∂b
= 1
Pt
for any b > Ptq
∗ and ∂Vt(b,a)
∂b
= χu′(b/Pt) + (1 −
χ)(1/Pt) for any b < Ptq
∗, and that ∂Vt(b,a)
∂a
= 1
Pt
always. Taking this into account, the necessary
and sufficient conditions for optimality in maximizing (21) subject to (22), (23), and (24) are
given by
β(1 +Rpt )Pt
Pt+1
= 1 (29)
and
Pt+1
β(1 +R)Pt
− 1 = χ
[
max
{
u′
(
Bt+1
Pt+1
)
, 1
}
− 1
]
. (30)
Unless households are satiated with liquidity (Bt+1/Pt+1 ≥ q∗), the rate of return on government
bonds will be lower than the one on private assets, and it could even be negative in real terms.
5.3 Does the FTPL Hold when Debt Provides Liquidity?
We can invert equation (30) to obtain the demand for real bonds as a correspondence of the real
interest rate on government debt, which yields the same equation as (15) for the overlapping-
generations economy economy, with f defined as
f(1 + rt+1) :

= 1
1+rt+1
(u′)−1
[
1
β(1+rt+1)
−(1−χ)
χ
]
for rt+1 < 1/β − 1
∈ [(u′)−1(1),∞) for rt+1 = 1/β − 1.
(31)
Since we are interested in equilibria where the real rate on government debt is below the growth
rate of the economy (zero, in our case), a necessary condition is that f(1) > 0, as in the OLG
economy, and we assume this to be the case: the demand for liquidity must be enough for house-
holds to be willing to hold government debt even at a zero real interest rate. Furthermore, no
equilibrium is possible if rt+1 > 1/β−1, since households would have an incentive to accumulate
indefinite savings at that interest rate.
With this definition of f , an equilibrium is characterized by the same difference equation as
in the previous section, which is (16) and (17) in terms of the interest rate, and (18) and (19) in
terms of real purchases of government bonds.
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While the equilibria of the two economies are described by the same difference equation, so
that several results will be similar, nonetheless some important differences must be noted:
• The domain of st is different: in an overlapping-generations economy, st can take values
in (−∞, wy), while in the liquidity economy its values must be contained in [0,∞). While
the difference at the top has no effect on the results, the inability to borrow from the
government has important implications for equilibrium selection. This is not surprising,
since we encountered in the previous section several instances in which the stable steady
state of the difference equation is negative.
• In the overlapping-generations economy, r(st) approaches infinity as st → wy; in contrast,
here r(st) is constant at 1/β − 1 when st ≥ βq∗.
• In the overlapping-generations economy, r(st) is finite at st = 0. In contrast, r(st) may
approach −1 at st = 0 if u satisfies Inada conditions.
To characterize the set of equilibria, we now study the steady states and convergence properties
of the difference equations, as we did in Propositions 1 and 2 for an OLG economy.
Proposition 3. • If τ > 0, the difference equation (18) admits exactly one steady state, with
positive savings.
• If τ = 0, the difference equation (18) admits exactly two steady states, one with zero and
one with positive savings.
• If τ < 0, there generically exists an even number of steady states, all of which feature
positive saving. If τ is sufficiently close to zero, the number of steady states is two, and if
it is sufficiently negative it is zero (no steady states exist).
Proof. As in Proposition 1, a steady state s¯ requires r(s¯)s¯ = τ , and sr(s) is monotonically
increasing when both s and r(s) are positive. We also know r := lims→0 r(s) ≥ −1, with equality
if limq→0 u′(q) =∞, and r(s) = 1/β − 1 for s ≥ βq∗, so that lims→∞ sr(s) =∞. sr(s) = 0 when
either s = 0 or r(s) = 0. From f(1) > 0 we know r(0) < 0, so r(s) = 0 occurs exactly at one
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point, at a value sˆ > 0, which proves the statement for the case in which τ = 0. For τ > 0, the
monotonicity properties of sr(s) and its limits imply that there exists exactly one steady state,
in (sˆ,∞), which again proves the relevant statement. Finally, for τ < 0, we know sr(s) > τ for
all values of s ∈ [sˆ,∞), and at s = 0. By continuity, the number of steady states in the interval
(0, sˆ) must be generically even.15 Continuity also implies the remaining properties of the last
bullet.
Away from a steady state, the dynamics are described in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. • If no steady state of the difference equation (18) exists, then st+1 is mono-
tonically increasing and government debt eventually explodes exponentially, violating a
household’s transversality condition, which cannot happen in an equilibrium.
• If τ > 0, such that a unique steady state s¯ exists, then for s1 > s¯, {st+1}∞t=0 is monotonically
increasing and government debt eventually explodes exponentially, violating a household’s
transversality condition. For s1 < s¯, {st+1}Tt=0 is monotonically decreasing until sT+1[1 +
r(sT+1)]− τ < 0, at which point the difference equation no longer has a solution.
• Let there be 2N steady states, ordered (s¯1, . . . , s¯2N). If the initial saving rate is s1 < s¯2,
then st converges monotonically to s¯
1. If N > 1 and s1 ∈ (s¯2k, s¯2k+2), k = 1, ...N − 1,
st converges monotonically to s¯
2k+1. Finally, if s1 > s¯
2N , then government debt eventually
explodes exponentially, violating a household’s transversality condition.
Proof. First, lims→∞ r(s)s = ∞, along with continuity, implies that st+1 > st always if no
steady state exists. In this case, equilibrium would require a monotonically increasing sequence
{st}∞t=0, which cannot converge, since any convergence point would have to be a steady state.
Once st ≥ βq∗, the difference equation becomes st+1 = st/β−τt+1, so that limt→∞ st+1/st = 1/β.
The household transversality condition requires
lim
t→∞
βtu′
(
max
{
Bt
Pt
, q∗
})
Bt
Pt
= 0.
15Footnote 11 applies here as well.
21
For st ≥ βq∗, Bt+1Pt+1 ≥ q∗, hence exponential growth in st at a rate β would not be optimal from
the households’ perspective. The same reasoning applies if τ > 0 and s1 > s¯, or if τ ≤ 0 and
s1 ≥ s¯2N .
When 2N steady states exist, continuity and the boundary properties of sr(s) at s = 0
and s = ∞ imply st+1 > st when st < s¯1, st > s¯2N , or st ∈ (s¯2k, s¯2k+1), k = 1, . . . , N − 1.
Conversely, st+1 < st when st ∈ (s¯2k−1, s¯2k), k = 1, . . . , N . The rest of the proof is identical to
Proposition 2.
While in the OLG economy a continuum of initial values of s1 is consistent with an equilibrium
(provided τ was such that an equilibrium exists), for the economy with liquidity this is only true
if τ ≤ 0. When τ > 0, a unique value of s1 (the steady state s¯) is consistent with an equilibrium,
so that the FTPL applies and we can recover the price level uniquely from the condition
B0
P0
= τ + s1. (32)
However, when τ > 0, the steady state is such that s¯r(s¯) > 0, which implies r(s¯) > 0: the
real interest rate on government debt is necessarily positive (above the zero growth rate of
the economy). The FTPL would hold in this case, but it negates the premise of our paper.
This observation has important implications when evaluating the effectiveness of fiscal policy
to fight deflation. According to the standard FTPL, lowering τ will increase prices.16 Hence,
a commitment to smaller fiscal revenues will lead to an immediate jump to higher prices. This
policy prediction ceases to be true in an economy in which government debt offers liquidity
services and the real interest rate is negative. 17 As discussed in Section 2, observing positive
debt and a persistently negative interest rate in this economy is by itself evidence that households
already expect primary deficits, at least in the long run, and that government debt retains positive
value only because it also provides liquidity services.18
16In our perfect foresight economy, lowering τ corresponds to a surprise revaluation of government debt, and is
subject to Niepelt’s [25] criticism. However, the same result applies in an economy in which τ is ex ante stochastic
and we are comparing across different realizations. See Daniel [12].
17More precisely, what is relevant is whether the interest rate is negative asymptotically, since our proofs rely
on limiting dynamics of the difference equation.
18A knife-edge situation arises for time-varying paths of taxes in which τt > 0 (at least asymptotically) but
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When τ ≤ 0, the FTPL breaks down in the same way it did in the overlapping-generations
economy. A continuum of values of s1 ∈ [0, s¯MAX] are consistent with a competitive equilibrium.
Unless the economy starts at the highest steady state s¯MAX, it converges to a lower steady state,
which involves positive debt if τ < 0 and no debt if τ = 0. Correspondingly, if the economy starts
with positive values of government debt and sMAX + τ > 0, a continuum of initial levels of prices
is consistent with an equilibrium, as described by equation (20); the same considerations about
comparative statics and the presence of a lower bound for prices that we discussed in Section 4
apply here as well. All of these results are reminiscent of the properties of equilibria with money-
supply rules in cash-in-advance economies, as in Matsuyama [23, 24] or Woodford [32]. This is
not surprising, since debt plays the same role as fiat money for this environment.19
6 Conclusion
The FTPL is not a robust equilibrium selection criterion when the interest rate is persistently
below the growth rate of the economy: whether the theory does or does not hold depends on
the specific economic forces that lead to low rates. In this paper, we have shown three broad
classes of models in which government bonds feature low returns (or low expected returns); the
situation is further complicated by the possibility that these reasons interact with each other.
As an example, government debt might have a specific liquidity role because of its favorable risk
profile; see Caballero and Farhi [6]. In turn, the greater liquidity role of debt in recessions might
limit the need for procyclical fiscal policy to support the debt’s favorable risk profile.20
In this paper, we have concentrated on stationary environments. As Figure 1 showed, the real
return on bonds has varied a great deal in the past decades, and it is possible that interest rates
taxes decay exponentially to zero. Adapting Proposition 1 in Tirole [30], one can then prove that there exists
a unique equilibrium, even though the interest rate is asymptotically negative. The FTPL would hold in this
knife-edge case. We are indebted to Gadi Barlevy for pointing this out.
19Remarks 1 and 2 apply to this section as well. In addition to the papers by Matsuyama and Woodford, the
potential for complicated dynamics is analyzed by Rocheteau and Wright [26] in an environment closer to ours.
20The role of term premia in explaining the recent experience of low interest rates is discussed in Campbell,
Sunderam, and Viceira [7] and Gourio and Ngo [16], among others.
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will exceed the growth rate again in the future. In such richer environments, the validity of the
FTPL would depend on the frequency and duration of low-rate episodes, in ways that could be
analyzed using a regime-switching model such as Chung, Davig, and Leeper [8] and Davig and
Leeper [13]. However, to the extent that policymakers are not confident about their ability to
estimate the true stochastic process of interest rates at a secular frequency, our analysis suggests
caution in relying on fiscal surprises to manage inflation.
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Appendix A A Positive Net Present Value with Negative
Expected Taxes
To discuss a specific example of Section 3, we now posit that the (log) endowment grows stochas-
tically over time according to:
ln yt − ln yt−1 = ln ∆ + εt, (33)
where εt is independent across time, with an exponential distribution with coefficient λ.
By using (33) and imposing market clearing (yt = ct), we rewrite the first-order condition (8)
at time t as
1 =β(1 + rt+1)∆
−γEt [exp{−γεt+1}]
It then follows
1 + rt+1 =
∆γ(γ + λ)
βλ
. (34)
Unlike in the previous two sections, here the level of the real interest rate is independent of
government policy, as long as an equilibrium exists. Given the real interest rate computed
above, equation (5) is satisfied if and only if
∆γ−1(γ + λ)
β(λ+ 1)
< 1. (35)
In order for the household problem to be well defined, parameters must be such that the utility
of consuming the endowment must be finite, which requires
λβ∆1−γ < (γ + λ− 1). (36)
Equations (35) and (36) are mutually compatible only if γ > 1, i.e., when agents are sufficiently
risk averse; in this case, there is a range of values for ∆ and λ such that the downside risk
(the inverse of ∆) and volatility (λ) are sufficiently elevated that (35) hold, but not as large as
yielding infinitely negative utility for the household.
Consider taxes next. It is convenient to define
xt := τt/yt,
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expressing the primary surplus as a share of total endowment. We study a tax rule in which xt
is a function x(εt) only, and government debt is risk free in real as well as in nominal terms. In
order for this to be the case, the price level Pt+1 must be time-t measurable. From equation (9),
Pt+1 =
Bt+1
x(εt+1)yt+1 + Et+1
∑∞
s=2
zt+s
zt+1
τt+s
=
Bt+1
yt+1
[
x(εt+1) + Et+1
∑∞
s=2 β
s−1
(
yt+s
yt+1
)1−γ
x(εt+s)
] . (37)
In equation (37), the assumption of i.i.d. growth and that the primary surplus/GDP ratio is
only a function of the current shock implies that Et+1
∑∞
s=2 β
s−1
[(
yt+s
yt+1
)1−γ
x(εt+s)
]
is a constant,
which we define ρ.21 It is straightforward to prove that ρ must be positive for government debt to
also be positive in the future: intuitively, the present value of future taxes must remain positive.
From equation (1), Bt+1 is predetermined (that is, time-t measurable). Hence, Pt+1 is time-t
measurable if and only if
x(εt+1) = x¯e
−εt+1 − ρ. (38)
for some constant x¯ > 0. Iterating on the definition of the present value of taxes ρ, we can
recover how it is related to x¯:
ρ =Et+1
[
βx(εt+2)
(
yt+2
yt+1
)1−γ
+
∞∑
s=3
βs−1
(
yt+2
yt+1
)1−γ
x(εt+s)
]
=βEt+1
[(
x¯e−εt+2 − ρ)(yt+2
yt+1
)1−γ
+
(
yt+2
yt+1
)1−γ
ρ
]
=
x¯β∆1−γλ
λ+ γ
.
(39)
Combining (38) and (39) and taking expected values, we obtain
Et(xt+1) =
x¯λ
λ+ 1
[
1− β∆
1−γ(λ+ 1)
λ+ γ
]
< 0,
where the last inequality follows from assuming that the interest rate is low, more precisely, that
(5) and hence (35) hold. Hence, in this i.i.d. economy, when parameters are such that (5) holds
and fiscal policy stabilizes the debt/GDP ratio, expected taxes one period ahead are always
negative.
21Note however that ρ depends on the function x(.), so we need to solve for both of them jointly in what follows.
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Appendix B A Model with Government Debt and Money
We reconsider the economy of Section 5, but we now explicitly introduce money, so that money
and government bonds circulate at the same time. The environment is the same as in Section 5,
except that government debt is no longer accepted with probability one in bilateral meetings,
but only with probability ζ ∈ (0, 1). In contrast, the central bank issues “money,” which is
perfectly durable, divisible, and intrinsically useless, and yields a zero nominal return. Money
is always recognized in bilateral meetings and can therefore be used with probability one. We
again assume that buyers make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the sellers, and they make their offer
knowing whether the seller is able to accept only money or both money and bonds in exchange
for goods.
In the centralized market, government debt is now a commitment by the government to
deliver the face value in money at maturity, justifying the assumption that it is nominal debt.
The central bank policy of setting an interest rate R implies that there is an infinitely elastic
supply of new one-period bonds vs. money, at a relative price 1/(1 +R).22
The government budget constraint is now modified to
Bt+1
1 +R
+Mt+1 = Bt +Mt − Ptτt. (40)
B.1 Characterizing the Economy
As before, denote with W and V the value functions when entering the centralized and decen-
tralized market, respectively. They now depend on money holdings m, in addition to government
debt holdings and private claims. We have
Wt(m, b, a) = max
c,y,b′,a′
{c− y + βEtVt+1(m′, b′, a′)} s.t. (41)
Ptc+
a′
1 +Rpt
+
b′
1 +R
+m′ ≤ Pt(y − τt) + a+ b+m, (42)
22See Bassetto and Phelan [4] for a discussion of the consequences of imposing limits to the central bank’s
ability to convert new bonds into money and vice versa.
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(23), (24), and
m′ ≥ 0. (43)
As government debt, money cannot be sold short.
The solution to the maximization problem above yields
Wt(m, b, a) = Wˆt +
a+ b+m
Pt
, (44)
where Wˆt is independent of the current state. When entering in the centralized market, private
claims and government bonds are both nominal, so they are a commitment to deliver money
in that market: hence, they are perfect substitutes for money at that stage. This implies that,
when able to accept government bonds, sellers are indifferent between receiving bonds or money.
When buyers and sellers meet in the decentralized market, let l˜ be the amount of nominal
claims that sellers receive in exchange for q˜ units of goods. Depending on the meeting, this can
take the form of money only, if the seller cannot accept government bonds, or both bonds and
money. Equation (44) then implies that the sellers’ participation constraint is
− q˜ + l˜/Pt ≥ 0. (45)
Buyers face again a linear price Pt when making their take-it-or-leave-it offer.
Using equation (26), and exploiting the fact that all the surplus from decentralized trade is
appropriated by the buyers, the value function at the beginning of the period, before it is known
who will be a seller, who will be a buyer, and who will not trade, is given by
Vt(m, b, a) =Wt(m, b, a) + χζ max
q
[u(q)− q] + χ(1− ζ) max
qˆ
[u(qˆ)− qˆ]
=Wˆt +
a+ b
Pt
+ χζ max
q
[u(q)− q] + χ(1− ζ) max
qˆ
[u(qˆ)− qˆ],
(46)
subject to
Ptq ≤ m+ b (47)
and
Ptqˆ ≤ m. (48)
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We thus get ∂Vt(m,b,a)
∂a
= 1
Pt
,
∂Vt(m, b, a)
∂b
=

1
Pt
if m+ b > Ptq
∗
χζu′
(
m+b
Pt
)
+ (1− χζ)(1/Pt) otherwise,
and
∂Vt(m, b, a)
∂m
=

1
Pt
if m > Ptq
∗
χ(1− ζ)u′
(
m
Pt
)
+ (1− χ(1− ζ))(1/Pt) if m ∈ (Ptq∗ − b, Ptq∗)
χζu′
(
m+b
Pt
)
+ χ(1− ζ)u′
(
m
Pt
)
+ (1− χ)(1/Pt) otherwise.
Taking this into account, the necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality in maximizing
(41) subject to (42), (23), (24), and (43) are given by (29),
Pt+1
β(1 +R)Pt
− 1 = χζ
[
max
{
u′
(
Mt+1 +Bt+1
Pt+1
)
, 1
}
− 1
]
, (49)
and
Pt+1
βPt
−1 = χζ
[
max
{
u′
(
Mt+1 +Bt+1
Pt+1
)
, 1
}
− 1
]
+χ(1−ζ)
[
max
{
u′
(
Mt+1
Pt+1
)
, 1
}
− 1
]
. (50)
We will assume that R > 0, for otherwise money and government bonds would have the same
opportunity cost and households would only hold bonds if they are satiated with liquidity. In this
case, the rate of return on money is always lower than the rate of government bonds; equations
(49) and (50) then imply that households will never find it optimal to accumulate enough money
so as to buy q∗ with money only. Government bonds will have a lower rate of return than
private assets when liquidity is scarce even in meetings where money and bonds are traded
((Mt+1 +Bt+1)/Pt+1 ≤ q∗).
We obtain an excess demand for money relative to government bonds
Pt+1
β(1 +R)Pt
− Pt+1
βPt
= −χ(1− ζ)
[
u′
(
Mt+1
Pt+1
)
− 1
]
(51)
which means that the bonds carry a liquidity premium over money.
We invert equation (49) to obtain the demand for total liquidity (money plus bonds), which
is given by
Bt+1 +Mt+1
Pt(1 +R)
= f(1 + rt+1) :=
1
1 + rt+1
(u′)−1
[
1
β(1+rt+1)
− (1− χζ)
χζ
]
. (52)
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Using this equation and (40), we obtain a difference equation
f(1 + rt+1) = (1 + rt)f(1 + rt)− R
1 +R
Mt+1
Pt
− τt. (53)
with an initial condition
f(1 + r1) =
B0 +M0 −RM1/(1 +R)
P0
− τ0.
Equation (53) differs from equation (16) due to the presence of seigniorage revenues. If taxes are
set so as to offset these revenues, i.e., if
τt = τ − R
1 +R
Mt+1
Pt
, (54)
the difference equation coincides with the cashless economy and the same results apply.23 In this
case, given an equilibrium path for the real interest rate {rt+1}∞t=0 which satisfies the difference
equation
f(1 + rt+1) = (1 + rt)f(1 + rt)− τ, t ≥ 1
along with the initial condition
f(1 + r1) =
B0 +M0
P0
− τ,
the additional equilibrium condition, which is equation (51), can be used to determine real (and
nominal) money balances.24
23Equation (54) assumes that the fiscal authority observes and can react to Mt+1 and Pt. These variables
are observed in the centralized (evening) market of period t, where taxes are also levied. The issue of joint
determination of macroeconomic aggregates and policy variables is at the heart of complications discussed in
Bassetto [2] and [3]. This is a side issue from the perspective of the current paper. However, for completeness,
(54) is a well-specified government strategy under the following description of the centralized market. First, the
government repays maturing bonds in money. Second, households participate in the goods market according to
some Walrasian mechanism (e.g., an auction), where money is used as numeraire. Households then purchase
new government bonds with money at the set nominal rate R. At this stage, households in the aggregate are
left with Bt + Mt − Bt+1/(1 + R) units of money. The government sets and collects nominal taxes equal to
Ptτt = Ptτ(1 +R)−R[Bt +Mt−Bt+1/(1 +R)], to be settled in money. Households are left in the aggregate with
Mt+1 = Bt +Mt −Bt+1/(1 +R)− Ptτt, and simple algebra shows that (54) holds. Finally, an auction opens for
private borrowing and lending.
24Note that knowing rt+1 is equivalent to knowing pit+1, given the nominal interest rate R and the definition
of real rate (14).
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